U.S. Role in the World

How much help should the U.S. offer Georgia? More U.S. humanitarian assistance has recently arrived in Georgia and aid is welcome but that fact the aid is delivered by warships is not making Russia happy (AFP - Second US aid ship arrives in Georgia):

A second US naval ship carrying aid to Georgia arrived in the southern port city of Batumi on Wednesday, avoiding another port where Russian troops are still operating. […] The Dallas started unloading its cargo to the strains of Georgian folk music and dancing as onlookers shouted “USA! USA!” and waved American and Georgian flags. […] Russia has criticised Washington’s decision to send two US warships and the coast guard cutter to deliver humanitarian aid to Georgia, where Russia sent troops and tanks this month. “Normally battleships do not deliver aid and this is battleship diplomacy, this does not make the situation more stable,” Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in Moscow on Tuesday. “I hope people who deliver humanitarian aid would be choosy about how they deliver it.”

In addition to humanitarian assistance there has been some talk that the U.S. may consider direct military assistance to Georgia (Reuters UK - U.S. assessing possible military aid to Georgia):

With Russian tanks and troops still occupying parts of Georgia, U.S. officials have said openly that Washington will consider new military assistance for the former Soviet state turned Western ally that has staunchly supported the U.S. war on terrorism and aspires to NATO membership. […] But one official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said U.S. and Georgian officials have begun a dialogue about the country’s potential military needs and that the U.S. side was awaiting a Georgian assessment of the damage sustained during the Russian onslaught.

This prompted a rather stern warning from Russia that direct military assistance would be seen as a declaration of war. Given the high stakes, does the U.S. have a moral obligation to help Georgia, and if so, how far should the U.S. go in providing help? In this video Matthew Yglesias, of the Center for American Progress, and Jonathan Chait, of The New Republic, debate the morality of helping Georgia.

It seems like each new day brings a new development in the Georgian crisis. Today President Bush reacted to Russia recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (The Associated Press - Bush slams Russian recognition of breakaway areas):

In an escalating war of words, President Bush on Tuesday urged Russia to reconsider its “irresponsible decision” to shower independent status on two breakaway Georgian provinces. Already rebuffed by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Bush warned Russia to change course and respect the borders of its Georgian neighbor. […] Bush shot back that Russia’s move violates both United Nations resolutions and the six-point cease-fire deal that Russia, under Medvedev’s watch, signed with Georgia to end a war. “We expect Russia to live up to its international commitments, reconsider this irresponsible decision, and follow the approach set out (in the cease-fire deal),” Bush said. The White House says the U.S. will use its veto power on the U.N. Security Council to ensure that the two separatist provinces remain part of Georgia in the eyes of the world.

In this op-ed, J. Victor Marshall argues that U.S. support for Kosovo’s independence from Serbia helped set the stage for the conflict in Georgia.

Just as NATO justified its intervention in 1999 as a humanitarian defense of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians against Serbian atrocities, so Russia said it came to the defense of South Ossetia, which suffered terrible atrocities at Georgian hands in the early 1990s, after Georgian troops shelled its capital earlier this month.

Marshall quotes several analysts who warned that U.S. support for an independent Kosovo could set a risky precedent for other countries. Is there any evidence that this may in fact be happening? Russia today warned Moldova to avoid a repeat of the Georgia crisis in their separatist Trans-Dniester region which is mainly populated by Russians and Ukrainians and already has Russian troops stationed there.

The West told Russia that Kosovo was a special case, but I fear that in world affairs such fine distinctions are not as clear as we would sometimes like or wish them to be. The borders of Europe had been settled by past conflict and by law until Kosovo once again opened the door to the nationalist aspirations of restless ethnic enclaves. This is a world that Woodrow Wilson would be comfortable with, but not one that we easily recognize.

As Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia the White House has decided to send Dick Cheney to Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Italy next week. I can’t help wonder if it would be more productive to send him to Russia as well? It seems to me that some clear communication with Russia might be in order.

In this New York Times op-ed, Prof. Ronald Steel, University of Southern California, argues that the U.S. needs to return to treating Russia as a superpower (A Superpower Is Reborn):

The limits of Russia’s post-cold-war retreat have apparently been reached, and the reversal of the power equation has gone too far to be sustained. Today’s leaders in Moscow are determined to protect what they perceive as their vital interests. The task for American leaders is not to pretend that these interests do not exist or can be safely ignored. Rather, it is to work out a modus vivendi based not on wishful thinking or dreams of even greater glory, but on the sober facts of power realities.

Prof. Steel offers specific steps on how to deal with Russia as we move past this Georgian crisis. I was struck by his comparison of Russia’s actions to how the U.S. has treated Latin American countries and our other neighbors in this hemisphere. That’s not to excuse any abuses, but it’s an important comparison and deserves consideration.

I’d like to recommend the Strategic Security blog of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) to you as a resource for keeping up with national security issues, particularly arms control of proliferation issues. The successful signing of the missile defense deal with Poland this week means that this issue has now returned to the forefront of the international agenda and it’s important that Americans understand this issue. Here is how FAS describe themselves from their About page:

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) was founded in 1945 by scientists who had worked on the Manhattan Project to develop the first atomic bombs. These scientists recognized that science had become central to many key public policy questions. They believed that scientists had a unique responsibility to both warn the public and policy leaders of potential dangers from scientific and technical advances and to show how good policy could increase the benefits of new scientific knowledge.

I like this blog because it offers more technical information than the standard mainstream news media reports, it’s written by scientists and allows you to appreciate some of the complex issues that get forgotten in the popular debate over these issues. If we are headed toward a new Cold War, we will need to be educated all over again about nuclear weapons, warheads, ICBMs, MIRVs, and all the other terms that have faded from our national consciousness over the last few decades and this is a great place to start.

The United States is now officially in the business of protecting Poland from missile attack (The Wall Street Journal - U.S.-Poland Deal on Missile Base Riles Russia):

The U.S. signed a pledge to protect Poland as part of a missile-shield deal, cementing the former East bloc country’s ties with Washington but thrusting it into the middle of a widening dispute with Russia.

The deal signed in Warsaw Wednesday to establish a battery of U.S. interceptor rockets on Polish soil is part of President George W. Bush’s plans to develop an intercontinental missile-defense shield. The shield’s stated aim is to protect the U.S. and its allies from attacks by U.S.-deemed “rogue states” such as Iran and North Korea.

Although this deal has been in the works for some time, it comes after the dramatic Russian - Georgian crisis set the entire region on edge. Poland gets 10 ground-based missile interceptors as well as Patriot missiles to defend against Russian missiles (Russia has already said that Poland will now be targeted for a missile strike, potentially nuclear, as a result of hosting the interceptors). The U.S. gets a forward base from which to take out any future ICBM launches from Iran and/or other rogue states destined for Western Europe or the East Coast of the U.S. This used to be called deterrence. However, because of the proximity to Russia, it’s now called provocation. How provocative is it to base interceptors so near Russia? How likely is it that 10 interceptors would diminish the nuclear deterrent of Russia, which, like the U.S., has a triad of air, sea and land based nuclear missiles numbering in the thousands?

For a Russian perspective on this, I’d like to recommend this report from RIA Novosti, it’s always instructive to remember that geopolitics means that things look very different depending on where you stand. One thing is certain, the U.S. has made a major strategic move, we can now expect a strong counter-move from Russia. There are early indications that this will involve a renewed Russian presence in the Middle East, perhaps basing Russian weapons in Syria. If these moves follow the pattern of the Cold War we can expect similar tit-for-tat moves leading up to new arms control summits that will either draw-down these weapon placements or codify a new era of superpower rivalry.

The president of Pakistan has resigned and his departure threatens to throw Pakistan into political chaos (The New York Times - Pakistani Parties Clash Over Reinstating Judge):

Political order in Pakistan frayed further on Tuesday, the day after President Pervez Musharraf resigned, raising questions about who in the deeply divided civilian government would be in charge and for how long.

The instant deterioration in relations within the government became evident when Nawaz Sharif, the leader of one of the two major parties in the governing coalition, the Pakistan Muslim League-N, walked out of a meeting here over the restoration of the chief justice of the Supreme Court, who had been dismissed by Mr. Musharraf. He then headed back to his home in Lahore, a four-hour drive away.

[…]

Even by the standards of Pakistan’s hard-boiled and volatile politics, the public discord between the political leaders was surprising, politicians said, a sign that opposition to Mr. Musharraf may have been the strongest thread tying them together.

From the days when he was just a general, to the coup, his uneasy reign as both president and general, and then to his final days as politically side-lined president, it has been a long and dramatic journey for Pervez Musharraf. He had a tough line to walk, navigating between a populace and a military heavily sympathetic to Islamic insurgents and a U.S. ally asking for help in defeating those same insurgents. Add to the mix a volatile relationship with neighbor and nuclear competitor India and you have the making of a rather thankless job. In the end, neither his American allies or his own people supported him. He was a patriot who placed his country first and tried to steer a middle path between multiple competing interests. I’m willing to bet that history will be kind to Musharraf, especially if his absence proves just how adept he was at keeping Pakistan stable. I hope that the United States will come to appreciate and honor the assistance that Musharraf provided in the War on Terrorism and that for all his failings (and there were many) we will look back on him as an able and valuable ally.

Have you read any good books lately? If you are looking for the next book (or three) to add to your reading list, the State Department has some suggestions (AFSA Reading List):

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and the President of the American Foreign Service Association have co-sponsored the creation of a Foreign Affairs Professional Reading List to serve as a resource for Foreign Service and Civil Service employees of the foreign affairs agencies. AFSA, the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, and the State Department’s Ralph J. Bunche Library, Office of the Historian, and Office of E-Diplomacy have compiled the list, with help from regional and functional bureaus. The list seeks to identify useful books and websites to serve as a point of departure for career-long, self-directed professional development.

The full list can be found here. Happy reading.

I’ve been searching for an authoritative review of U.S. options in the Russia-Georgia Crisis, but so far I’ve not found one. The blogosphere is filled with wild speculation and suggestions from both the left and the right, and I share the dismay voiced by Michael Cohen of Democracy Arsenal, that commentators seem quick to offer pronouncements on the crisis even if they appear to have little credibility for doing so (No Good Answers):

A couple of people have asked me why I haven’t written anything on Russia/Georgia war: the bottom line is that I’m a bit out of my element here. I am not an expert on Georgia or Russia and, as is often the case, I’m constantly amazed by the assuredness by which some bloggers have made pronouncements about how the United States should respond; as if this crisis lends itself to a simple black and white analysis. Even if you buy the notion that the Georgians are the white hats and the Russians the black hats (a persuasive argument indeed) that barely illuminates the situation or offers a road map going forward.

He goes on to note several broad U.S. response themes he has picked up on, including rearming Georgia, reaffirming Georgia’s sovereignty, and restarting the Cold War tradition of U.S.-Russian summits.

For now, it appears that the U.S. is still in the consultative phase, we are meeting with our allies and seeking to forge a consensus on how to respond to this crisis. Secretary Rice met today with NATO foreign ministers, and the official statement reveals the tension between the cautious older NATO members (who have vital energy interests at stake) and the newest members eager to safeguard their new autonomy from Russia. NATO foreign ministers agreed to:

1. welcome and endorse the ceasefire agreement
2. support humanitarian assistance
3. create a NATO-Georgia Commission to chart a path toward closer partnership with Georgia, including reconstruction assistance
4. suspend meetings of the NATO-Russia Council until Russian troops withdraw from Georgia
5. reconsider the question of Georgia membership in December

This is, I think, a thoroughly bureaucratic response, though it has the virtue of at least buying time to see what the Russians will do next. After the NATO meeting Secretary Rice departs for Poland to sign the new missile defense deal. It may be that as this day ends, it has been the U.S. and not NATO that has offered the most direct strategic response to an expansionist Russia.

Future historians may look back on the Georgian Crisis and define the attack on South Ossetia by Georgia as the proximate cause of the conflict while finding that several factors, including oil, ethnicity, nationalism, and alliances were the ultimate causes of the conflict. In Cracks in the Foundation: NATO’s New Troubles, Cato Institute Research Fellow Stanley Kober examines the role of alliances and focuses on NATO expansion:

When the Cold War ended and the Warsaw Pact dissolved, Russia agreed to live with NATO — even with a NATO that expanded to include a united Germany. But a triumphant alliance decided it should expand and take in new members. Incredibly, like Germany’s leaders a century before, American leaders (and their foreign allies) did not appreciate that alliances provoke the formation of counter-alliances. As NATO has expanded, Russia’s relations with China, in particular, have grown apace, leading initially to the formation of the Shanghai Five and then to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In other words, just as the Triple Entente gradually emerged in opposition to the Triple Alliance, so the SCO seems to be emerging in response to NATO expansion.

Can the Georgian conflict be seen in the context of an expanding NATO and a Russian desire to push back? Perhaps those future historians will note that although creating counterbalancing alliances is a normal and expected process in the international system, attacking neighbors to push back against a defensive alliance is likely to have the opposite effect than intended. Which is more likely: NATO will react by pulling back; or, NATO will react by rapidly adding Georgia to the alliance? There is some evidence for the latter, German leader Angela Merkel said yesterday that Georgia, “is on track to become a member of NATO.” If Russia ever meant to counter NATO expansion by demonstrating that there was nothing to fear from post-Soviet Russia, invading Georgia may have sent the wrong signal.