U.S. Role in the World

This is a follow-up to the previous post about the Russian decision to place short-range missiles in Kaliningrad. In this analsysis for ISN Security Watch, Sergei Blagov suggests that the Russian decision is not an attempt to challenge the new U.S. president (suggested by the timing of the announcement) but instead can properly been seen in the context of the moves and counter-moves by the U.S. and Russia over the issue of missile defense. It remains to be seen if today’s test of a new Iranian long-range missile (the kind the American ABM system is designed to protect against) will have any impact on the Russian decision. The U.S. quickly denounced the missile test.

I mentioned yesterday the Russian challenge to Obama, an escalation in the dispute over missile defense in Europe. Why is Russia mounting a nuclear challenge to a candidate who promised to dramatically change the U.S. nuclear policy by seeking a ban on the production of fissile materials, a reduction in nuclear stockpiles, a reaffirmation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and securing loose nuclear materials worldwide? One would think that this is a nuclear agenda that Russia would welcome. Of course, we don’t necessarily have to cast this in terms of nuclear policy, the U.S. ABM interceptors will not be nuclear and the Russian missiles probably won’t be nuclear either (they have stated that the missiles will be Iskander missiles, a nuclear-capable short-range mobile ground-launched missile), but the question remains, why alienate a president-elect that by all accounts is willing to adopt a more flexible and moderate approach than his predecessor? Stratfor suggests that the Russian action has less to do with missile defense and more to do with dividing Europe:

We expect Ukraine will have shifted its political alignment toward Russia, and Moscow will be rapidly moving to create a sphere of influence before Obama can bring his attention — and U.S. power — to bear.

Obama will again turn to the Europeans to create a coalition to resist the Russians. But the Europeans will again be divided. The Germans can’t afford to alienate the Russians because of German energy dependence on Russia and because Germany does not want to fight another Cold War. The British and French may be more inclined to address the question, but certainly not to the point of resurrecting NATO as a major military force. The Russians will be prepared to talk, and will want to talk a great deal, all the while pursuing their own national interest of increasing their power in what they call their “near abroad.”

President-Elect Obama will need to tap into every bit of the European goodwill they offered him during his campaign if he hopes to forge a united allied response to this Russian strategy.

I’d like to recommend the Strategic Security blog of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) to you as a resource for keeping up with national security issues, particularly arms control of proliferation issues. The successful signing of the missile defense deal with Poland this week means that this issue has now returned to the forefront of the international agenda and it’s important that Americans understand this issue. Here is how FAS describe themselves from their About page:

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) was founded in 1945 by scientists who had worked on the Manhattan Project to develop the first atomic bombs. These scientists recognized that science had become central to many key public policy questions. They believed that scientists had a unique responsibility to both warn the public and policy leaders of potential dangers from scientific and technical advances and to show how good policy could increase the benefits of new scientific knowledge.

I like this blog because it offers more technical information than the standard mainstream news media reports, it’s written by scientists and allows you to appreciate some of the complex issues that get forgotten in the popular debate over these issues. If we are headed toward a new Cold War, we will need to be educated all over again about nuclear weapons, warheads, ICBMs, MIRVs, and all the other terms that have faded from our national consciousness over the last few decades and this is a great place to start.

The United States is now officially in the business of protecting Poland from missile attack (The Wall Street Journal - U.S.-Poland Deal on Missile Base Riles Russia):

The U.S. signed a pledge to protect Poland as part of a missile-shield deal, cementing the former East bloc country’s ties with Washington but thrusting it into the middle of a widening dispute with Russia.

The deal signed in Warsaw Wednesday to establish a battery of U.S. interceptor rockets on Polish soil is part of President George W. Bush’s plans to develop an intercontinental missile-defense shield. The shield’s stated aim is to protect the U.S. and its allies from attacks by U.S.-deemed “rogue states” such as Iran and North Korea.

Although this deal has been in the works for some time, it comes after the dramatic Russian - Georgian crisis set the entire region on edge. Poland gets 10 ground-based missile interceptors as well as Patriot missiles to defend against Russian missiles (Russia has already said that Poland will now be targeted for a missile strike, potentially nuclear, as a result of hosting the interceptors). The U.S. gets a forward base from which to take out any future ICBM launches from Iran and/or other rogue states destined for Western Europe or the East Coast of the U.S. This used to be called deterrence. However, because of the proximity to Russia, it’s now called provocation. How provocative is it to base interceptors so near Russia? How likely is it that 10 interceptors would diminish the nuclear deterrent of Russia, which, like the U.S., has a triad of air, sea and land based nuclear missiles numbering in the thousands?

For a Russian perspective on this, I’d like to recommend this report from RIA Novosti, it’s always instructive to remember that geopolitics means that things look very different depending on where you stand. One thing is certain, the U.S. has made a major strategic move, we can now expect a strong counter-move from Russia. There are early indications that this will involve a renewed Russian presence in the Middle East, perhaps basing Russian weapons in Syria. If these moves follow the pattern of the Cold War we can expect similar tit-for-tat moves leading up to new arms control summits that will either draw-down these weapon placements or codify a new era of superpower rivalry.