U.S. Role in the World

I mentioned yesterday the Russian challenge to Obama, an escalation in the dispute over missile defense in Europe. Why is Russia mounting a nuclear challenge to a candidate who promised to dramatically change the U.S. nuclear policy by seeking a ban on the production of fissile materials, a reduction in nuclear stockpiles, a reaffirmation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and securing loose nuclear materials worldwide? One would think that this is a nuclear agenda that Russia would welcome. Of course, we don’t necessarily have to cast this in terms of nuclear policy, the U.S. ABM interceptors will not be nuclear and the Russian missiles probably won’t be nuclear either (they have stated that the missiles will be Iskander missiles, a nuclear-capable short-range mobile ground-launched missile), but the question remains, why alienate a president-elect that by all accounts is willing to adopt a more flexible and moderate approach than his predecessor? Stratfor suggests that the Russian action has less to do with missile defense and more to do with dividing Europe:

We expect Ukraine will have shifted its political alignment toward Russia, and Moscow will be rapidly moving to create a sphere of influence before Obama can bring his attention — and U.S. power — to bear.

Obama will again turn to the Europeans to create a coalition to resist the Russians. But the Europeans will again be divided. The Germans can’t afford to alienate the Russians because of German energy dependence on Russia and because Germany does not want to fight another Cold War. The British and French may be more inclined to address the question, but certainly not to the point of resurrecting NATO as a major military force. The Russians will be prepared to talk, and will want to talk a great deal, all the while pursuing their own national interest of increasing their power in what they call their “near abroad.”

President-Elect Obama will need to tap into every bit of the European goodwill they offered him during his campaign if he hopes to forge a united allied response to this Russian strategy.

Glenn Greenwald reacts in this Salon piece to an op-ed in The Washington Post by a Democrat and a Republican urging the next president to immediately prepare for war with Iran. Here is a quote that I find interesting:

It’s just objectively true that there is no country in the world — anywhere — that threatens to attack and bomb other countries as routinely and blithely as the U.S. does.  What rational leader wouldn’t want to obtain nuclear weapons in a world where the “superpower” is run by people like Dan Coats and Chuck Robb who threaten to attack and bomb whatever countries they want?  Even the Coats/Robb Op-Ed argues that Iranian proliferation would be so threatening to the U.S. because “the ability to quickly assemble a nuclear weapon would effectively give Iran a nuclear deterrent” — in other words, they’d have the ability to deter a U.S. attack on their country, and we can’t have that.

My question then is: Is the U.S. creating the world it is reacting against, a world in which nuclear proliferation and anti-Americanism are the primary choices left to rising regional powers? Are we creating the threats, or are we prudently anticipating and reacting to threats that would exist regardless of the path the U.S. takes?

This week we witnessed a dramatic showdown in Indian domestic politics between the Prime Minister and various factions who are against a proposed nuclear deal with the United States. Since India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has developed a nuclear weapons capability, the U.S. has been working on a treaty that will address India’s desire to use nuclear energy to accommodate one of the most dynamic economies on the planet while safeguarding India’s nuclear weapons program and curbing the proliferation of nuclear technology. If that sounds like a lot of concerns to address, it is, and such a complex treaty is proving to be difficult for India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to get passed in his parliament. His opponents in the always factious realm in Indian politics fear that this treaty will make India beholden to the U.S. and undermine India’s sovereignty. The government survived a confidence vote this week bringing the nuclear deal closer to approval (The Economist - A tarnished triumph):

After a rancorous, sometimes riotous, two-day debate on its most contentious policy, a nuclear co-operation agreement with America, India’s government on July 22nd won a parliamentary vote of confidence. This did not ensure the survival of the vexed agreement, on which George Bush and India’s prime minister, Manmohan Singh, shook hands in July 2005. It still needs the approval of several bodies, including the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). But the government’s victory, by 275 votes to 256, with ten abstentions, has probably saved it from strangulation by its Indian opponents.

The deal also has to be approved by the U.S Congress, and time is running out for approval before President Bush leaves office. If Congress approves the deal it will mark a new stage in U.S-India relations. I’m sure many of you remember that India has not always been an ally of the U.S. and sided with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The World Security Network offers this report that will help you get up to speed on the emerging strategic partnership between the U.S. and India.

Why is the U.S. working with India on their nuclear program while challenging Iran on theirs? A good answer to this question would touch on the fact that India is not a signatory to the NPT, so the U.S. is working with India on a treaty that will anchor their nuclear program in a framework of international monitoring and oversight. The U.S. is acting as a global leader to address the issue of nuclear proliferation and bring a country outside the scope of nuclear rules into a treaty arrangement. Iran is a signatory to the NPT, so they are already obligated and they enjoy the rights (which they are asserting) and obligations (which are in dispute) imposed by that treaty. Other explanations we could offer would note that Iranian leaders have repeatedly called for the destruction of another country (Israel) and exported a religious militancy that does not lend itself to traditional forms of deterrence. India appears to be on the path to becoming a responsible nuclear power and that, I think, is the difference between the two.

The Geneva meeting with Iran over the weekend did not go well. The presence of a U.S. representative apparently made little difference, nor did Iran appear to appreciate the gesture (The Washington Post - Iran Nuclear Talks End Without Agreement):

High-level international talks on Iran’s nuclear program ended inconclusively today in Geneva, with European envoy Javier Solana telling reporters that Iran needed to give a more definitive answer within two weeks.

The meeting was significant because for the first time a U.S. diplomat, Undersecretary of State William J. Burns, joined other envoys in meeting with the top Iranian nuclear negotiator. U.S. officials had said the shift in Bush administration policy was intended to help lead to a breakthrough in the impasse over the Iranian program, but if Iran failed to respond positively, it only would unify the international coalition dealing with Iran.

“It was a constructive meeting, but still we didn’t get the answer to our questions,” Solana said at a news conference. “We hope very much we get the answer and we hope it will be done in a couple of weeks.”

I can’t help but think that Iran passed up an important opportunity to show flexibility and that this does not bode well for an eventual diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis. What happens next? In true diplomatic fashion, the parties resolved to meet again in two-weeks, with continued Iranian intransigence expected to be met with another round of U.N. sanctions. If Iran does not compromise then the Security Council will be forced to consider stronger measures, which Russia and China may well veto, placing Iran on a path toward unilateral military action by the U.S. and Israel. The only real grounds for optimism I see is the prospect that Iran is waiting until after the U.S. presidential election in the hopes that they may get a better deal from the next president.

By now you have heard the news that a U.S. representative will attend a previously scheduled meeting tomorrow with an Iranian representative in Geneva. Although this represents a dramatic departure from the U.S. effort to isolate Iran, a skeptical observer may ask why this such an important move. Do we really expect a breakthrough? An op-ed in today’s New York Times addresses this issue (A Seat At The Table):

Mr. Bush’s decision to send William Burns (Ms. Rice’s third in command and a well-respected former ambassador to Russia) to join the European Union’s foreign policy chief and other top diplomats in talks with Iran makes any incentives package look more credible. It also shifts the diplomatic pressure back to Tehran. And it will make it harder for Beijing and Moscow to resist imposing a new round of sanctions if Iran remains obstinate.

So, the reply to our skeptical observer is that the presence of William Burns will strengthen the West’s negotiating position while creating a diplomatic opening for further engagement, should the meeting go well. Our skeptic may well point out, though, that Burns’ presence does nothing to enhance either the incentives or disincentives presented to Iran in the current proposal regarding uranium enrichment, nor have Iran’s “red lines” changed. Perhaps it is enough to say that Burns’ presence changes the style rather than the substance of the six-party effort to halt enrichment and that this change in style may encourage those on the Iranian side who may be looking for an opening to forge a compromise. In advance of this meeting then, let’s define our expectations: we are looking for some evidence of a new flexibility on the part of Iran, and if we see that, then perhaps we can say that the presence of an American representative was an experiment worth repeating.

Today’s New York Times offers some analysis (Policy Shift Seen in U.S. Decision on Iran Talks) of the potential breakthrough mentioned in the last post, and it looks like oil prices are starting to respond to the lessening tensions between the U.S. and Iran. In this video from The Council on Foreign Relations, foreign policy experts Trita Parsi and Barbara Slavin discuss relations between the United States and Iran, including Iran’s role in Iraq, the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate and prospects for an improved U.S.-Iran relationship. Let’s hope those prospects are brighter after the meeting this weekend.

A quick follow-up to my last post to note that the U.S. appears to be inching toward a new engagement with Iran. According to this New York Times report (U.S. Envoy to Join Meeting With Iranian):

President Bush has authorized the most significant American diplomatic contact with Iran since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, sending the State Department’s third-ranking official to Geneva for a meeting this weekend on Iran’s nuclear program, administration officials said Tuesday. The decision appeared to bend, if not exactly break, the administration’s insistence that it would not negotiate with Iran over its nuclear programs unless it first suspended uranium enrichment, as demanded by three resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.

Let’s hope the Iranian leadership will see this as a sign of a thaw and will reciprocate the gesture.

Should we talk to Iran? The U.S. has not had diplomatic relations with Iran since the Hostage Crisis of 1979 (holding the diplomatic staff hostage is generally not conducive to good relations) and the U.S. has used intermediaries ever since rather than risk sending personnel to a country where citizens still routinely gather to chant “death to America” while burning American flags. I’ve been told that such public gatherings are PR stunts and that the Iranian public still has a high regard for the people of the U.S, which is rather a nice thought if it’s true. Could it be that Iranian politicians manipulate domestic public opinion for political purposes? At any rate, when President Bush included Iran in his “Axis of Evil” he signaled there would be no rapprochement with Iran on his watch. More recently, relations with Iran entered into the U.S. primary election debate as candidates sparred over who would be the first to negotiate with Iran. Since the U.S. is officially not talking to Iran, such willingness to meet is seen by some as signaling a future policy shift away from the Bush effort to isolate Iran.

An idea to establish lower level contacts, perhaps as a precursor to re-establishing full diplomatic relations, has been proposed from time to time. Just last month the idea was debated in the press (Jerusalem Post - US mum on Iran interests section report):

The United States refuses to confirm reports about the possibility of opening an interests section in Teheran. Fred Hiatt, a columnist with The Washington Post, wrote Monday that “senior officials” at the US State Department were considering a proposal to open such a section. Through this, the US would be able to reach out to youth groups and dissidents, without re-establishing diplomatic relations with Teheran, Hiatt quoted one of the officials as saying. Hiatt further said the idea had been under discussion for almost two years and could be adopted within weeks.

This week former assistant secretary of state James Rubin endorsed the idea of opening an interest section in Teheran in an op-ed in The New York Times (Our Man in Iran?):

Iran is an anomaly in the Middle East. In Iran, unlike in the Arab world, America is seen as an adversary primarily by the government while most of the Iranian people see it as a country of freedom and moderation. American policy should build on this phenomenon. The more Iranians see the real America, rather than the propaganda version portrayed in their reactionary media, the more they will push for democratic rights at home and moderate behavior abroad. This is where our diplomats come in. The main purpose of sending them to Iran would be to simplify travel for Iranians to the United States.

Rubin contrasts our lack of engagement with Iran with our engagement of Russia and China during the Cold War (when the stakes where much higher) and suggests that a ground-level people-to-people approach may work well even as the governments still do not get along. If President Bush approves the opening of interest section in Teheran he can always say he is following a time-tested winning strategy. I think the American people would like that.

For those of you still in a patriotic mood after the Independence Day holiday, how would you like to read a speech given by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams on July 4, 1821? The American Diplomacy website provides a review and a link to the text of the speech. I thought the speech was interesting because it speaks to the constant tension in American foreign policy between isolationism and engagement (and some would say interventionism) with the world. In his speech, Adams says:

Wherever the standard of freedom and Independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.

What would Adams make of a world in which monsters are so self-evident that they needn’t be searched for? On a day when Iran demonstrated the capability to attack American interests throughout the Middle East, is Adam’s advice still relevant 187 years later?

It is fitting that progress on disarmament talks with North Korea has been made this week as this also marks another important milestone, the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty forty years ago this week. The treaty created a framework for countries to pledge not to seek nuclear weapons and for existing nuclear powers to pledge to work toward disarmament. Most countries in the world have signed the treaty (including the U.S.), three have not (Israel, Pakistan, and India) and one dropped out (North Korea). Progress is now being made with North Korea, the U.S. is negotiating a deal with India (actually the deal is done but domestic politics in India threatens to derail the deal), Israel remains a “secret” nuclear power (their approach is called strategic ambiguity or opacity, it’s designed to keep their neighbors guessing), and Pakistan, well there are major issues there to address but they seem to have been tabled by the war, at least for the time being. The treaty remains both relevant and timely, when you hear Iran assert their right to develop peaceful nuclear power, that right is enshrined in the NPT Treaty. For more information on this important treaty, I refer you to the Nuclear Vault maintained by the National Security Archive.