U.S. Role in the World

This is a follow-up to the previous post about the Russian decision to place short-range missiles in Kaliningrad. In this analsysis for ISN Security Watch, Sergei Blagov suggests that the Russian decision is not an attempt to challenge the new U.S. president (suggested by the timing of the announcement) but instead can properly been seen in the context of the moves and counter-moves by the U.S. and Russia over the issue of missile defense. It remains to be seen if today’s test of a new Iranian long-range missile (the kind the American ABM system is designed to protect against) will have any impact on the Russian decision. The U.S. quickly denounced the missile test.

I mentioned yesterday the Russian challenge to Obama, an escalation in the dispute over missile defense in Europe. Why is Russia mounting a nuclear challenge to a candidate who promised to dramatically change the U.S. nuclear policy by seeking a ban on the production of fissile materials, a reduction in nuclear stockpiles, a reaffirmation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and securing loose nuclear materials worldwide? One would think that this is a nuclear agenda that Russia would welcome. Of course, we don’t necessarily have to cast this in terms of nuclear policy, the U.S. ABM interceptors will not be nuclear and the Russian missiles probably won’t be nuclear either (they have stated that the missiles will be Iskander missiles, a nuclear-capable short-range mobile ground-launched missile), but the question remains, why alienate a president-elect that by all accounts is willing to adopt a more flexible and moderate approach than his predecessor? Stratfor suggests that the Russian action has less to do with missile defense and more to do with dividing Europe:

We expect Ukraine will have shifted its political alignment toward Russia, and Moscow will be rapidly moving to create a sphere of influence before Obama can bring his attention — and U.S. power — to bear.

Obama will again turn to the Europeans to create a coalition to resist the Russians. But the Europeans will again be divided. The Germans can’t afford to alienate the Russians because of German energy dependence on Russia and because Germany does not want to fight another Cold War. The British and French may be more inclined to address the question, but certainly not to the point of resurrecting NATO as a major military force. The Russians will be prepared to talk, and will want to talk a great deal, all the while pursuing their own national interest of increasing their power in what they call their “near abroad.”

President-Elect Obama will need to tap into every bit of the European goodwill they offered him during his campaign if he hopes to forge a united allied response to this Russian strategy.

While President-Elect Obama is busy planning his transition, the foreign policy challenges he will face are not waiting for his inauguration. Russia welcomed his election with an announcement that they will station missiles on Russia’s western border to counter the U.S. missile defense system (WaPo editorial here), sparking fears of a new arms race. And as this AP report notes, that is only one of the many challenges facing the new president. 

In my e-mail this morning I found the latest newsletter from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace promoting their comprehensive series of reports examining the foreign policy challenges facing the next president:

Next January, the new U.S. President will be confronted with the longest list of severe challenges any president has faced in decades. Prioritizing among them will be even more important than usual. In its new series, “Foreign Policy for the Next President”, the Carnegie Endowment’s experts endeavor to do just that. They separate good ideas from dead ends and go beyond widely agreed goals to how to achieve them.

Topics in the series include nuclear weapons, dealing with Iran, engaging Pakistan, the rise of Asia, the League of Democracies idea, Mideast peace, and climate change.

It would appear that Russia has recently changed course rather dramatically and has left the U.S. looking for the proper response. In the latest example, Russia has embarked on a program to modernize the armed forces (Times Online - Russia to build missile defence shield and renew nuclear deterrence):

In a sharp escalation of military rhetoric, Mr Medvedev ordered a wholesale renovation of Russia’s nuclear deterrence and told military chiefs to draw up plans to reorganise the armed forces by December.

He said that Russia must modernise its nuclear defences within eight years, including the creation of a “system of air and space defence”.

The announcement puts Russia in a new arms race with the United States, which has infuriated the Kremlin by seeking to establish an anti-missile shield in eastern Europe.

Those concerned about our ability to follow the latest twists and turns of Russian foreign policy may be reassured by this piece by Dmitri Trenin, author of Getting Russia Right, in which he places Russian foreign policy in historical context and finds in these latest moves a reflection of Russian desire to chart an independent course.

There have been a number of developments in Latin America that on the surface appear to be great challenges for the United States. Venezuala’s president Hugo Chavez has emerged as a leader of a new anti-American movement, welcoming trade deals with Iran and hosting new military ventures with Russia. Bolivia has also signed billion dollar trade deals with Iran to develop natural gas and oil resources. In a new essay posted to the American Diplomacy website, Hal Brands reviews the current state of U.S. relations with Latin America and finds reasons for optimism. Looking forward to the challenges that the next president will face, he identifies five “essential tasks” for the U.S. to accomplish in order to maintain positive U.S.-Latin American relations in the near-term. The new president will face great challenges but will also have an opportunity to open a new chapter in the history of U.S. relations with Latin America, let’s hope he takes advantage of it.

Having recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia has now decided to keep troops in those disputed regions (The New York Times - Moscow Will Keep Troops in Georgia Enclaves):

Defense Minister Anatoly E. Serdyukov told Mr. Medvedev during a televised meeting on Tuesday that about 3,800 troops would remain in each breakaway region. Georgian officials estimate that there were about 2,200 Russian troops in each enclave before fighting erupted on Aug. 7.

It’s clear that dealing with a newly assertive Russia will be a top priority for the next president. This feature by the Public Broadcasting Service offers a nice overview of the differences between Sens. John McCain and Barack Obama on this important topic.

Of course, we won’t have a good handle on how to deal with Russia unless we also have a sense of how Russia is evolving. Is Russia in a post-Putin era, or is Putin now moving Russia into a new pre-Czarist period with Putin as the new Czar? The Chronicle of Higher Education recently gathered together some top Russia analysts to ponder this question and their analysis offers an educated guess on the near-term future of Russia that may allow the U.S. to better calibrate our responses.

Russia is gloating after the weekend EU summit failed to impose sanctions for the invasion of Georgia. The EU decided to do what it could to help Georgia rebuild and may consider further actions in the future, depending on whether Russia honors the ceasefire agreement. Meanwhile, Dick Cheney is in the region to offer U.S. support as the White House announced a major new aid package (The New York Times - White House Unveils $1 Billion Georgia Aid Plan):

President Bush proposed $1 billion in humanitarian and economic assistance on Wednesday to help rebuild Georgia after its short, disastrous war with Russia last month, but he stopped short of committing the United States to re-equipping its battered military. Mr. Bush announced the infusion of aid as Vice President Dick Cheney arrived here in what he described as a demonstration that the United States had “a deep and abiding interest” in keeping Georgia and other neighboring states free from a new era of Russian domination. […] The initial money, Mr. Bush said in a statement, would be used to feed and shelter tens of thousands of Georgians displaced during the fighting that began on the night of Aug. 7 when Georgia tried to establish control over a breakaway region, South Ossetia, only to be driven back by Russian forces. Mr. Bush also pledged to support its transition to a democratic market economy.

It would appear that Russia has gained territory and Georgia has gained foreign aid. In this interview posted on the Foreign Policy website (Seven Questions: Russia’s Big Mistake), Paul A. Goble explains why Russia is not really the winner in the Georgian crisis.

Let’s take a step back and review the situation with Russia and Georgia. Georgia attacked the breakaway region of South Ossetia, Russia invaded Georgia to defend South Ossetia, and proceeded farther into Georgia proper, then retreated somewhat to an expanded security zone, still inside Georgia, and now has recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Over the weekend Russia claimed this as a rightful defense of a Russian sphere in influence. Let’s play the devil’s advocate and ask, why not? Can the U.S. and the West really object to Russian attempts to assert great power prerogatives after our own history in Iraq and Serbia? This editorial in today’s Washington Post explains why the Russian invasion of Georgia and recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are very different from the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the NATO attack on Serbia. There are strong parallels, of course, but there are also stark differences that we would do well to keep in mind. 

It seems like each new day brings a new development in the Georgian crisis. Today President Bush reacted to Russia recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (The Associated Press - Bush slams Russian recognition of breakaway areas):

In an escalating war of words, President Bush on Tuesday urged Russia to reconsider its “irresponsible decision” to shower independent status on two breakaway Georgian provinces. Already rebuffed by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Bush warned Russia to change course and respect the borders of its Georgian neighbor. […] Bush shot back that Russia’s move violates both United Nations resolutions and the six-point cease-fire deal that Russia, under Medvedev’s watch, signed with Georgia to end a war. “We expect Russia to live up to its international commitments, reconsider this irresponsible decision, and follow the approach set out (in the cease-fire deal),” Bush said. The White House says the U.S. will use its veto power on the U.N. Security Council to ensure that the two separatist provinces remain part of Georgia in the eyes of the world.

In this op-ed, J. Victor Marshall, of The Independent Institute, argues that U.S. support for Kosovo’s independence from Serbia helped set the stage for the conflict in Georgia.

Just as NATO justified its intervention in 1999 as a humanitarian defense of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians against Serbian atrocities, so Russia said it came to the defense of South Ossetia, which suffered terrible atrocities at Georgian hands in the early 1990s, after Georgian troops shelled its capital earlier this month.

Marshall quotes several analysts who warned that U.S. support for an independent Kosovo could set a risky precedent for other countries. Is there any evidence that this may in fact be happening? Russia today warned Moldova to avoid a repeat of the Georgia crisis in their separatist Trans-Dniester region which is mainly populated by Russians and Ukrainians and already has Russian troops stationed there.

The West told Russia that Kosovo was a special case, but I fear that in world affairs such fine distinctions are not as clear as we would sometimes like or wish them to be. The borders of Europe had been settled by past conflict and by law until Kosovo once again opened the door to the nationalist aspirations of restless ethnic enclaves. This is a world that Woodrow Wilson would be comfortable with, but not one that we easily recognize.

As Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia the White House has decided to send Dick Cheney to Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Italy next week. I can’t help wonder if it would be more productive to send him to Russia as well? It seems to me that some clear communication with Russia might be in order.